RESEARCH PROJECT
Anthony Eden & Suez





The Suez crisis of 1956 was the consequence of collusion between Britain, France and Israel. The invasion of Egypt was; to facilitate regime change, remove a “dictator”, the installation of a pro-Western government, the protection of oil supplies to Europe and pre-emptive self-defense. The aggressive parties attempted to circumnavigate the international rule of law by deception and misinterpretation. It divided the country, caused international uproar and enormous pressure to manipulate the BBC was exerted. It relegated Britain to be forever aligned with US foreign policy. The similarities with the 2003 invasion of Iraq are striking.






CONTENTS PAGE
ABSTRACT page 1

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES page 3

INTRODUCTION page 3

RATIONALE page 3

METHODOLOGY page 3

MAIN BODY, EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS pages 4-8

CONCLUSION page 9

EVALUATION page 9

BIBLIOGRAPHY page 10

APPENDICES page 11














INTRODUCTION
This paper will explore collusion and conspiracy in the Suez crisis of 1956, and draw comparisons with the 2003 invasion of Iraq; a contentious subject that received extensive coverage in the media but especially in the light of recently released documents from the Public Records Office. It was the seminal point in the British psyche for loss of Empire, diminution of British influence and isolation of Eden’s government by the Americans; justifiably angry at being betrayed and deceived. It was pivotal in defining geo-political alliances of the time.
RATIONALE
In 1952, General Mohammed Neguib and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser achieved a bloodless coup in persuading King Farouk I to abdicate. The Egyptian revolutions’ outcome was Neguib as Commander-in-Chief, Prime Minister and President of the Republic and Nasser as Interior Minister. April 1954 saw Nasser sworn in as Prime Minister and within a year, President; the first native Egyptian to lead his country in 2,500 years.
“The Suez Canal Base, at the pivot of Europe, Asia and Africa, was the largest base in the world, through which supplies and troops were shipped to all theatres of the war.” (Lucas, p6)
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
This paper will investigate the role of the countries and politicians involved how it nearly destroyed the Anglo-American alliance and ended British supremacy in the Middle-East. The methods employed by all sides are Byzantine and Machiavellian with only Nasser and Eisenhower emerging with any shred of respect. Nasser’s aims were to expand arable land in Egypt and re-distribution of wealth through nationalisation. To achieve this, the Aswan High Dam required finance for construction and the Egyptian Army had to be modernised and re-equipped.

METHODOLOGY

In choosing the sources, consideration was given to the thirty year rule and sources that utilised it, in order to facilitate reading and understanding to ensure a smooth flow of events to assist the reader in ascertaining the direction events were taking. The internet was avoided where possible other than to retrieve maps and letters that had been authenticated and pertinent to the project. Sources chosen were primary wherever possible and bias is to be found only in Khrushchev’s comments; made extensive use of cabinet papers, public records, US archives, UK national archives and The Jewish Virtual Library and declassified US records








NASSER MEETS EDEN
On February 20th 1955, Eden (appendix 1) and Nasser met for the first and only time, to celebrate the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty but actually, Eden intended to encourage Nasser to join Britain in a military defence pact (appendix2). For Nasser, this was anathema, military co-operation with the West; autonomy was his goal. The differences between them were accentuated that evening at dinner. It would prove to be the catalyst for the Suez crisis. Eden invited Nasser to dinner at the British Embassy in Cairo. Nasser arrived in field uniform as lieutenant-colonel, Eden in full evening dress and addressing Nasser in classical Arabic learned at Oxford and spoke in Classical Arabic. His attitude was arrogant and colonial, belittling Nasser, “After dinner....[Eden] sat back on the sofa, when Nasser was speaking, with his eyes slightly averted and a look on his face which suggested that he was saying to himself,””What can this young officer tell me about international politics?”” Nasser commented afterwards,” What elegance! It was made to look as if we were beggars and they were princes!” His officers suspected that an attempt to portray them as inferior and impress Eden’s wife Clarissa. (Lucas pp40-41) “Nasser thought Eden behaved like a prince dealing with vagabonds.”
It was not the first time Eden attempted to impress Clarissa amongst foreign politicians. “...at the Summit meeting it was quite interesting. Eden had just married his second wife, who was much younger...Mr [sic] Eden, I think, was quite interested in keeping his impression of glamour as much to her as to the public. He was obviously taking sun baths-or a sun-lamp- every day, because during the whole conference he was a blooming, vigorous tan. And he was quite chagrined, I think, because he didn’t come out of the conference as the outstanding diplomat...” This was the view given by Roderic O’Connor of the US State Department present at the summit (Carlton pp377-3780). O’Connor continues describing how Eisenhower received all the attention from the Russians and how the British and French were sidelined,”...the Russians were knocking the British down and we were knocking the Russians down”. It was at this summit that Britain’s decline became evident to Eden and the British elite.
6th April 1955: Eden arrives at Buckingham Palace to be received by the Queen, the fourth monarch he had served as a Cabinet minister, finally achieving his life ambition.
Churchill commented, “The dream of his life”. (Carlton, p367)
Nasser, Egypt, Israel and Gaza
Several diplomats met in Paris in August 1952 for peace talks which were, “intimate” and “intense” although not yielding significant results, a number of foreign officials including British MP’s Crossman, Orbach and Banks, the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester B. Pearson and the Israeli Prime Minister, Moshe Sharrett attended. Sharrett faced opposition from his Government not to give any concessions until peace was promised. Sharrett’s predecessor, David Ben-Gurion, appointed people, which shared his belief in strong measures against Arabs, maintaining contact with Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff and Pinhas Lavon, the Defence Minister. Ben-Gurion’s key strategy: disproportionate reprisals against Arab States. In November 1951 to November 1952, 39 Israelis died in border clashes and 394 Arabs in Israeli raids. This policy continued after his “retirement”. A special commando unit, force 101 was created for these purposes. Israeli military intelligence established a spy ring in Cairo without informing Sharrett. This ring committed terrorist atrocities, bombing British and American buildings to sabotage Anglo-Egyptian relations and arrested shortly afterwards. Two were executed in January 1955, one committed suicide. This crisis led to resignations: Colonel Benjamin Gibli, Head of Military Intelligence and Defence Minister Lavon. In 1955, Ben-Gurion succeeded Lavon and pressured Shallett. Ben-Gurion and the IDF wanted revenge for the spies’ deaths. Sharrett approved a raid into Gaza, Dayan convinced him only 9 or 10 Egyptians would be killed. Ben-Gurion and Dayan attacked with two platoons blowing up pumping stations, infrastructure, shelling barracks and ambushing reinforcements. 38 Egyptians were killed. (Lucas pp42-43)
Gaza became a watershed in Arab-Israeli relations. In March 1955, Ben-Gurion proposed occupying Gaza and cancelling Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreements. Each side sought re-armament but The Tripartite Declaration (appendix 3) had been signed on May 25 1950 by France, Britain and the USA. France, having lost Syria and Lebanon in WWII sought fresh grounds. The French started selling arms to Israel. Nasser, upon discovering this, requested arms ordered from Britain in 1949. Sir Anthony Nutting, Minister of State, objected because of Israeli concerns. The alternative for Nasser was to seek arms from Khrushchev. This led the Eisenhower administration to cancel American financial and technical support for the Aswan Dam. Nasser, enraged, nationalised the Suez Canal ((appendix 4). Eisenhower urged the British and French for restraint (Ambrose p431) (appendix 5)
KHRUSHCHEV AND THE SOVIET
Khrushchev was initially cautious, after Nasser seized power he waited to see how the coup would progress. He had his hands full with Poland and Hungary; after putting down “the mutiny” in Hungary, his representatives met with Nasser after China mediated on Nasser’s behalf. “Things changed during the intervening years. Our economy, our armed forces, and the weight of our influence in international affairs all increased mightily, and by 1956 we were able to step in and assist President Nasser and the Arab peoples. It wasn’t that we wanted to replace England as an exploiter of Egypt and other Arab countries. We weren’t motivated by self-centred, mercantile interests. Quite the contrary, we wanted only to help these people to cast off the yoke of their servile dependence on their colonial masters. Ours has been a noble mission in the near East”. Nasser’s representatives requested military aid to pressure England: “We agreed. We gave them weapons ranging from rifles to regular artillery, but, as I recall, we didn’t give them any planes at first. We did, however, give tanks and naval equipment. Nasser said he particularly needed torpedo boats. I think we gave them military aid on a commercial basis, but at a reduced price”. (Khrushchev pp431-433)

REACTION IN ENGLAND
“Any military action against Egypt should be launched against some provocative or aggressive act by the Egyptians...The government might be compelled to take advantage of any provocative act by Egypt, even though it came at a time when the preparations for military operations were less well advanced than might have been desired”. Dissenting voices such as Labour MP’s Denis Healey and Douglas Jay gave a blunt piece of advice to Eden in the Times,” If the government seriously means to use military force over Suez other than in self-defence, or in pursuance of our International Charter they will do so in defiance of our international obligations and the UN Charter, they will do so in defiance of very large sections of opinion in this country”. (Lucas p165)
The result of a Gallup poll, 10th August 1956: 74% favoured the freezing of Egyptian assets in Britain, and 65% approved of military preparations but only 33% endorsed military action. (Appendix 6)
THE BBC
The role of the BBC at this time can also be compared to the one at the beginning of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It strove to keep impartiality but was being hectored and bullied by Eden’s government. The parallel, with the Blair’s relationship with the BBC, and the Eden’s is uncanny. Clarissa Eden was convinced of a “conspiracy” against her husband and wrote a memorandum to Press Secretary Clark complaining about the make-up portraying her husband with “Charlie Chaplin eyes”. (Lucas pp165-167)
The Eden government actually proposed that”...to consider by what means the Government...control over...broadcast to the Middle East and East Asia. The idea of a foreign office official be seconded to the BBC to oversee government propaganda was given serious consideration. (PRO, CAB 134/1215 (56) 9th meeting 25th July 1956 (Lucas pp 164-167)
THE SEVRES PROTOCOL, CONSPIRACY AND COLLUSION
The strategy, military logistics and finalisation of the planning for the invasion occurred at Sevres, on the outskirts of Paris. The protocol of agreement between France, Britain and Israel was signed by French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, David Ben-Gurion for Israel and Patrick Dean for Britain. (Appendix 7) (See letters; Donald Logan)
INVASION
On the 29th October 1956 four low flying Israeli Mustangs destroyed Egyptian communications infrastructure in the Sinai and 395 Israeli paratroopers were dropped in the Mitla pass (see maps appendix 8 )As agreed at Sevres, the Israelis slowed their advance, Eden kept up the pretence by feigning innocence in the House of Commons and stuck to the Sevres plan. The House was informed of the Anglo-French call for bilateral withdrawal 10 kilometres either side of the Canal and refusal would mean Anglo-French military action. The Israelis were still 50-100 miles away from the Canal at this stage. The treachery of Eden was becoming apparent to all. Walter Monckton had resigned already (letters appendix 9) and Hugh Gaitskill told Douglas Jay,” I shall never believe anything Eden says to me in public or private”. In the Commons, as leader of the Labour party, Gaitskill clashed with Eden over his refusal to ask the Security Council for immediate Israeli withdrawal. Eden cabled Eisenhower but not until 5.45 pm and the message did not reach Eisenhower until 8.30 pm London time. Eden blamed ciphering delays but the Americans suspected a “fait accompli.”Foster Dulles to Senator Knowland,” The evidence is that the Israelis were used as a decoy (for Britain and France)...He had solemn assurances they would not-though they were private.” Dulles told Eisenhower that the ultimatum “was as crude and brutal as anything he’d seen.” (Lucas pp260-262) Two days later the British bombed Cairo. The military campaign was on schedule and the Egyptian air force was annihilated. The Israelis were in control of Sinai and had established field headquarters at Mitla (see maps). The main Anglo-French force, consisting of a huge armada was sailing from Malta for Port Said. Propaganda leaflets were being dropped on Cairo as part of psychological warfare and everything proceeded according to the Sevres plan. (Carlton pp448-449) Nasser sank all the ships in the Canal as a response, effectively shutting it down.
EISENHOWER AND THE USA
Eisenhower: “The plot reeked of 19th Century colonialism of the worst sort; it reeked of bad planning; it reeked of bad faith and perfidy. It also violated the 1950 Tripartite Declaration. We cannot be bound by our traditional allowances but must instead face the question on how to make good our pledge [The Tripartite Declaration].” He wanted to tell the British, that the US would side with Egypt ...nothing justifies double-crossing us.” An embargo on oil sales to Britain came into effect. (Ambrose p440-442)

The invasion was an opportunity for Khrushchev and Bulganin. They took advantage with ruthless efficiency by crushing the Hungarian uprising as the Anglo-French task force approached Port Said. Three days later, 20,000 Hungarians and 3,000 Soviet troops were killed. The Hungarian uprising was over. A young diplomat, later to become Foreign Secretary (Lord Douglas Hurd) recalled,”...nursed in my mind a private hope that somehow, somewhere, deep in Whitehall, there was a master plan which would make everything right...Nutting was close to the Prime Minister, indeed his protégé. If there was a master plan he would have known it. Nutting had left, so there was no master plan, no aces, no trumps; just deception. Would deception now be followed by defeat?” Nutting had resigned on November 3rd (Hurd pp138 139)
DEFEAT
Britain’s most sympathetic American ally, Secretary of State, Foster Dulles was admitted to hospital on November 3rd, 1956. The diagnosis was cancer of the colon. His replacement Herbert Hoover Jr had no sympathy for the British because of disputes over Saudi Arabian oil concessions, Iran and Buraimi. His views were shared by Assistant Secretary for Middle Eastern affairs, William Rountree and made public in a campaign speech by Vice-president Nixon, on the 2nd November: “In the past the nations of Asia and Africa have always felt we would, when the pressure was on, side with the policies of the British and French Governments in relation to the once colonial areas. For the first time in history we have shown independence of Anglo-French policies towards Asia and Africa.” (Lucas p28)
The Soviet’s response was to withdraw their ambassador from Israel and threaten the Western powers and Israel with nuclear Armageddon (see letters, Ben-Gurion/Bulganin.)
LESTER B PEARSON AND THE UNITED NATIONS
Lester B. Pearson was a seasoned diplomat, experiencing wartime postings in Washington and London and Canadian Minister for External Affairs at the time of the Suez crisis. He believed that Canada could be a neutral voice on the world stage but feared for perceived bias as the USA’s friendly neighbour. In response to the Soviet threat and Middle East stalemate, Pearson proposed a resolution: unilateral ceasefire and a UN peacekeeping force. The British were reluctant but when tabled, all 57 member nations voted for it. This was the first large international peacekeeping force. It consisted of 6,000 men from ten countries under the command of a Canadian General, E.L.M. Burns. It maintained peace until Egypt asked it to leave in 1967. Pearson emerged as a hero and won the Nobel Peace Prize and elected prime minister in 1963. (Appendix 8) (www.cbc.ca )

CONCLUSION
The Suez crisis became a debacle because Eden did not strike quickly and hard enough, to succeed he should have used paratroops and occupied Egypt by controlling Suez. If he had done this, he could have presented the Americans with a fait accompli which would have been accepted by them because it was their objective also; removal of Nasser and the installation of a pro-Western government The Americans did not want a socialist controlling the oil fields and its’ supply route; especially one buying arms from the Soviets and who had recognised Red China. Eden had an irrational belief in Britain’s influence by not recognising the new world order and acting unilaterally with France and Israel; that Britain did not need American endorsement. The venture failed politically and financially and Eden became ostracised by the Eisenhower Administration. To his dying day, Eden denied the existence of The Protocol of Sevres, thereby damaging his own credibility, honour and integrity. The price paid by his successors, Butler and Macmillan, was permanently playing second fiddle to the Americans, cemented at the Bermuda meeting between Macmillan (now Prime Minister) with Eisenhower in Bermuda, in March 1957. The British would follow American policy (American unilateral action) in the Middle East and concentrate on safeguarding oil supplies in the Persian Gulf. The man who encouraged Eden’s’ adventure, Macmillan, would erase all mention of Suez from his memoirs
EVALUATION
The amount of material published on Suez is enormous and extensive but apart from Lucas, does not have the advantage of being supported by declassified and newly released documents subject to the thirty year rule. The findings suggest that if the same methods and motives were to be employed similarly today would lead to far more serious repercussions than the resignation of the minister responsible. It was badly planned and executed and established Israel as a nuclear power. In return for Israel assuming the mantle of the aggressor Ben-Gurion demanded and received French assistance, technical support and finance for building Israel’s nuclear reactor. It led to the Middle East becoming the most lucrative market for arms and instability which exists today.
The definitive book written about Suez (in my opinion) is that by Scott Lucas, Divided We Stand, because it is the only book so far to make use of the thirty year rule and had access to recently released archives. He also had the advantage of being an history lecturer at Birmingham University and utilised his students to the full in writing his book.
The most important lesson learned in researching this project was the existence of a paper trail leading all the way to the top. The reading of cabinet papers imparted a sense of history that was almost palpable and reading the comment given by a person I have actually met (Lord Douglas Hurd) was inspiring, (second paragraph page 8). The other significant lesson learned was from Dr. Khaled Hroub Director of the Cambridge Arab Media Project Department, Institute of Arabic and Middle Eastern Studies at Cambridge University. He taught me how to apply mathematics to project dissertations and the art of objectivity when writing of emotive issues and how to lead the reader into accepting a point of view. Some of our email exchanges are in the appendices.
If this project were to present itself again I would not choose this topic because of the limited word count. To truly do justice to this topic I would require 10,000 words. The title is Anthony Eden and Suez, this paper confined itself to that but for the sake of relativity, other characters were mentioned to give the reader a sense of history.









BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ambrose, E. EISENHOWER Simon and Schuster London 2003
Carlton D. Anthony Eden ALLEN LANE London 1981
Hurd D, Lord Memoirs LITTLE BROWN London 2003
Lucas, Scott Divided We Stand. Hodder and Stoughton London 1991
Khrushchev, N. (translated by Talbott, S) KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS ANDRE DEUTSCH London 1971
Turner, J. MACMILLAN LONGMAN Harlow 1994
HANSARD
National Archives
Jewish Virtual Library
www.bbc.co.uk
www.cbc.ca.com






APPENDICES
1) Anthony Eden thumbnail sketch

2) The Baghdad Pact

3) The Tri-Partite Declaration

4) Statement of Gamal Abdel Nasser; Nationalisation of the Suez Canal

5) Statement by Eisenhower on Middle East and Israeli mobilisation

6) Hansard

7) The Protocol of Sevres

8) Presence and Functions of UNEF

9) Letters

10) Maps

11) Selection of cartoons reflecting the impact of the Suez crisis

12) Selection of recollections of primary sources


























Anthony Eden
Robert Anthony Eden, born on the 12th June 1897 at Windelstone Hall, Bishop Auckland in County Durham was the son of a baronet, Sir William Eden and Lady Sybil, nee Grey whose great-uncle was Lord Grey of The Great Reform Bill and received a classical education at Eton and Oxford. He entered parliament aged 23 as MP for Warwick and Leamington with a meteoric rise in politics elevating him to Foreign Secretary at the age of 38. He served as Foreign Secretary thrice, lastly in Winston Churchill’s cabinet. He was acknowledged as uncontested successor and Leader of the Conservative Party but constantly frustrated by Churchill clinging on to power and continually hinting that he would; much like Blair stringing Brown along.
Churchill’s delay in transferring power to Eden was a contentious issue; when Churchill was elected in October 1951, he hinted at handing over to Eden within a year, but Churchill’s attachment to power as international politician postponed his departure until April 1955. “Eden chafed under the wait. As the months passed, he developed a constant anxiety about the Premiership and impatience with the Prime Minister for staying on; for fear that some other aspirant might overtake him in the race for the succession.” (Lucas, p54)
It is strikingly familiar with the saga of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Two men, friends and colleagues for a very long period have an agreement and then one reneges and has to be prised out of office. In October 1955 Churchill, upon being informed that opinion favoured a change in leadership he responded with a very Blairite major Ministerial shuffle. Eden would have to wait.
Eden flew to the Middle-East, on his last major assignment as Foreign Secretary to gather support for the ill-thought out “Baghdad Pact”, an American initiative to for regional consensus of shared political, military, and economic ideals and agreements but doomed to failure because of ongoing tension and conflict in the area, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the event, only Pakistan and Turkey signed in 1954. Iraq and Pakistan followed the year after. Nasser refused to sign up to this and without Egyptian participation the pact would not work. He viewed the pact with suspicion. Instead, an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed.